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Thieves of State: Why Corruption Threatens Global Security exposes an
understudied contributor to extremism—corruption—examining several
countries where institutional corruption has fed popular dissatisfaction with
Western-backed governments, providing Islamic extremists fertile ground for
recruitment and support.
A former NPR reporter and special adviser to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Sarah Chayes is a senior associate in the Democracy and Rule
of Law Program and the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment.
She has produced a valuable work informed by her own decade of South Asia
experience, revealing specific ways government structures in the surveyed
countries permit and encourage corruption, at the expense the governed.
Ms. Chayes approaches the issue in both a personal and historical way, using
her own discovery of corruption in Afghanistan to introduce the theme. To
put corruption and poor governance into context, she quotes medieval
European and Islamic “mirrors for princes,” in which past thinkers wrote
advice to rulers – or rulers to their successors—on how best to rule. These
sources reveal a long tradition of corruption and avariciousness in Europe
and the Middle East, assuming the best rulers should rein them in, ensuring
fairness to their subjects. Noting the existence of hundreds of these works,
she cites English, French, Scottish, Irish, Arab, and Persian writers, and the
more famous Machiavelli, Erasmus, and Luther, to argue such problems have
long troubled observers of governance. She continuously refers to these
earlier perceptions when surveying the contemporary societies she analyzes.
Chayes describes in detail the unique structure of corruption in many
countries. She adds an appendix with diagrams showing the flow of money,
protection, and punishments across various entities or groups, to show how
corruption and power flows in select countries, both in public and behind the
scenes. She provides such diagrams for Afghanistan, Egypt/Pakistan,
Tunisia, Uzbekistan, and Nigeria, and, for comparison purposes, the Catholic
Church around 1500 and a “Happy” government today. While Westerners
working in developing countries quickly understand corruption can be
pervasive, they often do not grasp way in which a given society operates.
Chayes performs this service, suggesting each has its own riff on kleptocracy.
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Focusing on Afghanistan, she notes she was often hoodwinked in her early
years there, not understanding how hidden relationships influenced specific
officials’ behaviors. Noting that corrupt intermediaries often block leaders’
access to the people, Chayes cites an example of American leadership seeking
to preserve relationships with corrupt Afghan officials; she is scathing in her
criticism of General Stanley McChrystal and his staff for blocking a meeting
with knowledgeable tribal elders because the Karzai-linked Kandahar
governor learned of it in advance and raised such a fuss that it was cancelled
to avoid conflict with the U.S. government’s “partners.” She criticizes the
government-to-government focus U.S. military and diplomats often prefer,
with the West perceiving governments as a bastion of stability, with
corruption a secondary concern. She convincingly argues this drives the
common people from supporting governments that do not treat them fairly,
forging a breeding ground for extremism and hostility to the West. The West
is seen as propping up its oppressors, by active financial support or ignoring
misdeeds. She maintains seeking security before good governance is the
wrong approach and security instead emerges from the citizenry perceiving
government as just and working in their interest. Chayes concludes that, in
Afghanistan, the government was a vertically-integrated criminal
organization, where corruption flows up, with low-level officials paying off
their superiors, who then owe them protection, and the highest leaders
moving money out of the country.
She covers the countries of the Arab Spring, with whole chapters on Egypt
and Tunisia, touching on Morocco and Algeria. In the former, even educated
people cannot get jobs unless they have contacts among the ruling elite, with
military and other government staff often performing work to benefit
superiors. Algerians are too exhausted by the 1990s’ violence to protest. She
terms Egypt a “Military Kleptocratic Complex” where the military, which the
public esteems because of its role in Egypt’s nationalist rebirth, runs whole
industries for the benefit of its officers, with a parallel system of crony
corruption for civilian government. She sees Tunisia as an example of
“Bureaucratic Kleptocracy,” where the party and family of Ben Ali used the
private sector, especially banks, to steal brazenly enough to spark the Arab
Spring,
Uzbekistan is her example of the Post-Soviet space, where she identifies three
parallel kleptocratic networks. President Karimov’s daughter’s network
squeezes money out of international investors, such as telecommunications,
in exchange for permission to operate, while impeding those unwilling to pay.
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The two other networks are the cotton sector and the National Security
Service that controls cross-border activities.
Chayes concludes her country analyses with Nigeria, a “Resource
Kleptocracy,” where corruption flows downward; the top receives vast oil
profits, and payments flow down in a patronage system. Corrupt civil
servants access public funds through widespread contract fraud, gaining
positions through education.
She reviews how the anti-corruption fight emerged in Europe, focusing on the
Dutch revolt against their Hapsburg overlords and the English Civil War, a
response to Charles I’s autocratic rule. She traces the concept of popular
sovereignty and ways to prevent abuse of power from Milton to Locke,
Montesquieu, and Madison. She attributes this movement’s development in
Protestant societies to an awareness, articulated by Martin Luther, of the
corrupt nature of the official Catholic Church. The Reformation and the Wars
of Religion were a revolution against kleptocracy. In the Netherlands, for
example, mobs destroyed churches and religious symbols of a church seen as
fully corrupt, and Chayes terms the perpetrators religious extremists.
The most valuable discussion, though too brief, was Chayes’ prescriptions for
tackling corruption using specific categories and summing up the points made
throughout. Chief of State and Diplomatic Tools should enunciate an
anticorruption policy, avoid high-profile meetings with corrupt leaders, better
engage with the populace, support institutions and programs that fight
corruption, and avoid encouraging short-term economic wins that profit
kleptocrats. Intelligence Tools should analyze how corrupt networks
function. Financial System Tools and Legal Tools could track and prosecute
or sanction corrupt officials, with increased efforts to seize assets. Aid Tools
could reduce opportunities for theft, choosing implementing partners
unconnected to the corrupt networks, conditioning funding to avoid
benefiting kleptocrats, and supporting honest players. Security Sector Tools
could tailor military assistance to avoid alliances of convenience and better
analyze corrupt networks. Multilateral Tools echo the above in the
international context. Business Tools emphasize business’ role – and interest
– in eliminating corruption. Citizen Tools allow average citizens to identify
corruption and corrupt players.
Her short Epilogue entitled “Self-Reflection” expresses her belief that misuse
of state assets is not limited to the developing world. She sees the financial
meltdowns in Ireland and Iceland in the wake of the 2007-2008 global crash
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as due to the political elite favoring the financial industry. More controversial
is her final point that the Great Recession was itself caused by similar avarice
after the ruling class accepted that Wall Street deregulation was the moral
goal. The great failure might have been not holding government and business
leaders in the U.S. criminally responsible for actions causing the recession.
While I have no genuine criticism of the book, it could have noted to how legal
immunity can inhibit prosecution of corruption. Many countries grant
elected and appointed officials full immunity from civil suit and criminal
prosecution for corrupt acts and even violence. In contrast, in the United
States, immunity is limited, with legislators protected while traveling to
legislative sessions and for statements made in the legislature, with no
immunity for criminal acts.
Ms. Chayes has produced an insightful work that policy-makers and
development and national security experts should consider when designing
approaches to corrupt regimes. The positive reception to her book suggests
she has made a long-term contribution to more fine-tuned discussion of what
threatens international security.
Benjamin Dille, Foreign Service Officer (see disclaimer)
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